Abstract. We show how to obfuscate a secret shuffle of ciphertexts: shuffling becomes a public operation. Given a trusted party that samples and obfuscates a shuffle before any ciphertexts are received, this reduces the problem of constructing a mix-net to verifiable joint decryption. We construct public-key obfuscations of a decryption shuffle based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem and a re-encryption shuffle based on the Paillier cryptosystem. Both allow efficient distributed verifiable decryption. Finally, we give a distributed protocol for sampling and obfuscating each of the above shuffles and show how it can be used in a trivial way to construct a universally composable mix-net. Our constructions are practical when the number of senders N is small, yet large enough to handle a number of practical cases, e.g. N = 350 in the BGN case and N = 2000 in the Paillier case.
Introduction
Suppose a set of senders P 1 , . . . , P N , each with input m i , want to compute the sorted list (m π(1) , . . . , m π(N ) ) of messages while keeping the permutation π secret. A trusted party can provide this service. First, it collects all messages. Then, it sorts the inputs and outputs the result. A protocol, i.e., a list of machines M 1 , . . . , M k , that emulates the service of this trusted party is called a mix-net, and the parties M 1 , . . . , M k are referred to as mix-servers. The notion of a mixnet was introduced by Chaum [9] and the main application of mix-nets is to perform electronic elections.
Program obfuscation is the process of "muddling" a program's instructions to prevent reverse-engineering while preserving proper function. Barak et al. [2] first formalized obfuscation as simulatability from black-box access. Goldwasser and Tauman-Kalai [15] extended this definition to consider auxiliary inputs. Some simple programs have been successfully obfuscated [8, 26] . However, generalized program obfuscation, though it would be fantastically useful in practice, has been proven impossible in even the weakest of settings for both models (by their respective authors). Ostrovsky and Skeith [21] consider a weaker model, publickey obfuscation, where the obfuscated program's output is encrypted. In this model, they achieve the more complex application of private stream searching.
Our Contributions
We show how to obfuscate the shuffle phase of a mix-net: shuffling becomes a public operation, leaving only verifiable decryption to be performed privately. We show how any homomorphic cryptosystem can provide obfuscated mixing, though the resulting mix-net becomes inefficient. We show how special and distinct properties of the Boneh-Goh-Nissim [7] and Paillier [22] cryptosystems enable obfuscated mixing efficient enough to be practical in some settings.
We formalize our constructions in the public-key obfuscation model of Ostrovsky and Skeith, whose indistinguishability property closely matches the security requirements of a mix-net. Of course, in a mix-net setting, one cannot expect a single party to generate a complete and correct obfuscated shuffle: we describe an efficient zero-knowledge proof of the correct obfuscation of a shuffle and a protocol that allows a set of parties to jointly and robustly generate an obfuscated randomly chosen shuffle. Our mix-nets require considerably more exponentiations, roughly quadratic in the number of senders N instead of linear, than private mix-net techniques, yet they remain reasonably practical for precinct-based elections, where voters are anonymized in smaller batches and all correctness proofs can be carried out in advance.
Previous Work
Most mix-nets in the literature are based on homomorphic cryptosystems and use the re-encryption-permutation paradigm introduced by Park et al. [23] and made universally verifiable by Sako and Kilian [24] . Each mix-server in turn reencrypts and permutes the ciphertexts. The first efficient zero-knowledge shuffle proofs were given independently by Neff [20] and Furukawa and Sako [14] . Groth [17] generalized Neff's approach and improved its efficiency. A third, different, approach was given recently by Wikström [28] . The first definition of security of a mix-net was given by Abe and Imai [1] and the first proof of security of a mix-net as a whole was given by Wikström [27, 28] . Wikström and Groth [30] give the first adaptively secure mix-net.
Multi-candidate election schemes where the set of candidates is predetermined have been proposed using homomorphic encryption schemes, initially by Benaloh [6, 5] and subsequently by others to handle multiple races and multiple candidates per race [10, 25, 11, 13, 3, 17] . Homomorphic tallying is similar to obfuscated shuffles in that, on and after election day, only public computation is required for the anonymization process. However, homomorphic tallying cannot recover the individual input plaintexts, which is required by the election laws in some countries and in the case of write-in votes.
Ostrovsky and Skeith define the notion of public-key obfuscation to describe and analyze their work on streaming-data search using homomorphic encryption [21] . In their definition, an obfuscated program is run on plaintext inputs and provides the outputs of the original program in encrypted form. We use a variation of this definition, where the inputs are encrypted and the unobfuscated program may depend on the public key of the cryptosystem.
Notation
We denote by κ the main security parameter and say that a function (·) is negligible if for every constant c there exists a constant κ 0 such that (κ) < κ −c for κ > κ 0 . We denote by κ c and κ r additional security parameters such that 2 −κc and 2 −κr are negligible, which determines the bit-size of challenges and random paddings in our protocols. We denote by PT, PPT, and PT * , the set of uniform polynomial time, probabilistic uniform polynomial time, and nonuniform polynomial time Turing machines respectively. In interactive protocols we denote by P the prover and V the verifier. We understand a proof of knowledge to mean a complete proof of knowledge with overwhelming soundness and negligible knowledge error. We denote by Σ N the set of permutations of N elements. And we write Λ π = (λ π ij ) for the corresponding permutation matrix. We denote by M pk , R pk , and C pk , the plaintext space, the randomizer space, and the ciphertext space induced by the public key pk of some cryptosystem.
Homomorphic Cryptosystems
In the following definition we mean by abelian group a specific representation of an abelian group for which there exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing the binary operator and inversion.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic).
A cryptosystem CS = (G, E, D) is homomorphic if for every key pair (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ )
1. The message space M pk is a subset of an abelian group G(M pk ) written additively. 2. The randomizer space R pk is an abelian group written additively. 3. The ciphertext space C pk is a abelian group written multiplicatively. 4. For every m, m ∈ M pk and r, r ∈ R pk we have E pk (m, r)E pk (m , r ) = E pk (m + m , r + r ).
Furthermore, if M pk = G(M pk ) it is called fully homomorphic, and if G(M pk ) = Z n for some integer n > 0 it is called additive.
For an additively homomorphic cryptosystem, RE pk (c, r) = cE pk (0, r) is called a re-encryption algorithm.
Functionalities
Definition 2 (Functionality). A functionality is a family F = {F κ } κ∈N of sets of circuits such that there exists a polynomial s(·) such that |F | ≤ s(κ) for every F ∈ F κ .
Specifics of the Model. In the original Ostrovsky and Skeith definition [21] , plaintext inputs are processed by an obfuscated program into ciphertext outputs. In our setting, inputs are already encrypted. Thus, the original functionality, not just the obfuscator, depends on the same public key (and possibly the secret key). The security of the obfuscation-i.e. the indistinguishability property-is then defined separately, following the pattern of Ostrovsky and Skeith. In addition, as this is a public-key obfuscator, the output of the obfuscated program requires a decryption. We call the reader's attention to the difference between the encryption layers: this obfuscation-related encryption is distinct from the encryption under which inputs are presented.
Definition 3 (Public-Key Obfuscator). An algorithm O ∈ PPT is a publickey obfuscator for a functionality F with respect to a cryptosystem CS = (G, E, D) if there exists a decryption algorithm D ∈ PT and a polynomial s(·) such that for every κ ∈ N, F ∈ F κ , (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ ), and x ∈ {0, 1} * ,
Example 1. Suppose CS is additively homomorphic, (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ ), a ∈ M pk , and define F a (pk, sk, x) = ax, where x ∈ M pk . An obfuscated circuit for functionality F of such circuits can be defined as a circuit with E pk (a) hardcoded which, on input x ∈ M pk , outputs E pk (a)
x = E pk (ax).
We extend the definition of polynomial indistinguishability (known as IND-CPA security for public-key cryptosystems) to our public-key obfuscator.
Experiment 1 (Indistinguishability, Exp
Definition 4 (Indistinguishability). A public-key obfuscator O for a functionality F with respect to a cryptosystem
The obfuscator in Example 1 is polynomially indistinguishable if CS is polynomially indistinguishable (IND-CPA secure.)
Shuffles
The most basic form of a shuffle is the decryption shuffle. It simply takes a list of ciphertexts, decrypts them and outputs the plaintexts in permuted order. In some sense this is equivalent to a mix-net.
Definition 5 (Decryption Shuffle).
A CS-decryption shuffle, for a cryptosystem CS = (G, E, D) is a functionality DS N = {DS N (κ),κ } κ∈N , where N (κ) is a polynomially bounded and polynomially computable function, such that for every κ ∈ N, DS N (κ),κ = {DS π } π∈Σ N (κ) , and for every (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ ), and c 1 , . . . , c N (κ) ∈ C pk the circuit DS π is defined by
One way to implement a mix-net is to use the re-encryption-permutation paradigm of Park et al. [23] . Using this approach the ciphertexts are first reencrypted and permuted in a joint way and then decrypted. The re-encryption shuffle below captures the joint re-encryption and permutation phase. Both types of shuffles are illustrated, in their obfuscated form, in Figure 1 .
Definition 6 (Re-encryption Shuffle). A CS-re-encryption shuffle, for a homomorphic cryptosystem CS is a functionality RS N = {RS N (κ),κ } κ∈N , where N (κ) is a polynomially bounded and polynomially computable function, such that for every κ ∈ N, RS N (κ),κ = {RS π,r } π∈Σ N (κ) ,r∈({0,1} * ) N (κ) , and for every (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ ), and c 1 , . . . , c N (κ) ∈ C pk the circuit RS π,r is defined by The obfuscation of two types of shuffle. The circle denotes the encryption scheme under which inputs are encrypted. The square denotes the encryption scheme used by the obfuscator, which may depend on the circle encryption scheme and its keypair. The left-most inputs and right-most outputs do not include the square-layer encryption, which is only used by the public-key obfuscation process. An obfuscated decryption shuffle "swaps" one encryption scheme for the other, while an obfuscated re-encryption shuffle "layers" the two encryption schemes. The dashed circle denotes a re-encryption of the original ciphertext.
A Generic Decryption Shuffle
We show that, in principle, all that is needed is an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Consider two semantically secure cryptosystems, CS = (G, E, D) and CS = (G , E , D ), with CS being additively homomorphic with binary operator ⊕ on ciphertexts. Suppose that ciphertexts from CS can be encrypted under CS for all (pk, sk) ∈ G(1 κ ) and (pk , sk ) ∈ G (1 κ ), i.e., C pk ⊆ M pk . The following operations are then possible and, more interestingly, indistinguishable thanks to the semantic security of both cryptosystems:
We use a b to denote the homomorphic operation a ⊕ a ⊕ . . . ⊕ a, b times.
The Obfuscator
Consider a permutation matrix Λ π = (λ π ij ) corresponding to a permutation π. Consider its element-wise encryption under CS with public key pk and a corresponding matrix of random factors (
pk it is possible to perform homomorphic matrix multiplication as
.
Definition 7 (Obfuscator). The obfuscator O for the decryption shuffle DS
, and outputs a circuit that hardcodes C π , and on input
Technically, this is a decryption shuffle of a new cryptosystem CS = (G , E, D), where CS executes the original key generators and outputs ((pk, pk ), (sk, sk )) and the original algorithms E and D simply ignore (pk , sk ). We give a reduction without any loss in security for the following straight-forward proposition. We also note that O does not use (sk, sk ): obfuscation only requires the public key. 
Limitations of the Generic Construction
The matrix C π requires a proof that it is the encryption of a proper permutation matrix. This can be accomplished using more or less general techniques depending on the cryptosystem, but this is prohibitively expensive in general.
Even if we prove that C π is correctly formed, the post-shuffle verifiable decryption of E pk (E pk (m i )) to m i is prohibitively expensive: the inner, intermediate ciphertext E pk (m i ) is exactly the input ciphertext, which means it cannot be revealed without trivially leaking the permutation. Given this constraint, we know of no efficient way, not even a cut-and-choose approach, to prove correct decryption. Instead, we turn to more efficient constructions.
Obfuscating a Boneh-Goh-Nissim Decryption Shuffle
We show how to obfuscate a decryption shuffle for the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem [7] by exploiting both its additive homomorphism and its one-time multiplicative homomorphism.
The BGN Cryptosystem
We denote the BGN cryptosystem by
It operates in two groups G 1 and G 2 , both of order n = q 1 q 2 , where q 1 and q 2 are distinct prime integers. We use multiplicative notation in both G 1 and G 2 , and denote by g a generator in G 1 . The groups G 1 and G 2 exhibit a polynomial-time computable bilinear map e :
We refer the reader to [7] for details on how such groups can be generated and on the cryptosystem's properties, which we briefly summarize here.
, e(·, ·)) as above such that n = q 1 q 2 is a κ-bit integer. It chooses u ∈ G 1 randomly, defines h = u q2 , and outputs a public key pk = (n, G 1 , G 2 , e(·, ·), g, h) and secret key sk = q 1 . Encryption in G 1 . On input pk and m, E bgn selects r ∈ Z n randomly and
Since decryption computes a discrete logarithm, the plaintext space must be restricted considerably. Corresponding algorithms E bgn and D bgn perform encryption and decryption in G 2 using the generators G = e(g, g) and H = e(g, h). The BGN cryptosystem is semantically secure under the Subgroup Decision Assumption, which states that no A ∈ PT * can distinguish between the uniform distributions on G 1 and the unique order q 1 subgroup in G 1 respectively.
Homomorphisms. The BGN cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. We need this property, but we also exploit its one-time multiplicative homomorphism implemented by the bilinear map:
The result is a ciphertext in G 2 which cannot be efficiently converted back to an equivalent ciphertext in G 1 . Thus, the multiplicative homomorphism can be evaluated only once, after which only homomorphic additions are possible. For clarity, we write c 1 ⊕c 2 def = c 1 c 2 for ciphertexts in G 1 or G 2 and c 1 ⊗c 2 def = e(c 1 , c 2 ) for ciphertexts in G 1 .
The Obfuscator
Our obfuscator is based on the fact that matrix multiplication only requires an arithmetic circuit with multiplication depth 1. Thus, the BGN cryptosystem can be used for homomorphic matrix multiplication. Consider a
, and let A = (a ij ) and B = (b jk ). Define homomorphic matrix multiplication by
, and outputs a circuit with C π hard-coded
Note that O bgn does not use sk. From Proposition 3, we get:
N is polynomially indistinguishable if the BGN cryptosystem is polynomially indistinguishable.
Composition. Ciphertexts in G 2 cannot be efficiently converted back into equivalent ciphertexts in G 1 . In addition, we do not know how to select groups G 1 and G 2 such that G 2 exhibits a new bilinear map into a third group. Thus, the BGN-based shuffle construction we propose here is not composable: we can only mix once. Thus, in Section 7, we explain how to achieve the distributed generation of a BGN shuffle.
Obfuscating a Paillier Re-encryption Shuffle
We show how to obfuscate a re-encryption shuffle for the Paillier cryptosystem [22] by exploiting its additive homomorphism and its generalization introduced by Damgård et al. [12] . We expose a previously unnoticed homomorphic property of this generalized Paillier construction.
The Paillier Cryptosystem
We denote the Paillier cryptosystem
Key Generation. On input 1 κ , G pai chooses safe primes p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q +1 randomly such that n = pq is a κ-bit integer, defines global parameter v = n + 1 and outputs a public key pk = n and a secret key sk = p.
Encryption. On input pk and m ∈ Z n , E pai selects r ∈ Z * n randomly and outputs v m r n mod n 2 . Decryption. On input sk and c, given e such that e = 1 mod n and e = 0 mod φ(n), D pai outputs (c e − 1)/n.
The Paillier cryptosystem is polynomially indistinguishable under the Decision Composite Residuosity Assumption, which states that no A ∈ PT * can distinguish the uniform distribution on Z * n 2 from the uniform distribution on the subgroup of nth residues in Z * n 2 .
Generalized Paillier. Damgård et al. [12] [12] for details) and we use M n s+1 and C n s+1 to denote the corresponding message and ciphertext spaces. Homomorphisms. The Paillier cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. Furthermore, the recursive structure of the Paillier cryptosystem allows a ciphertext E pai n 2 (m) ∈ C n 2 = Z * n 2 to be viewed as a plaintext in the group M n 3 = Z n 2 that can be encrypted using a generalized version of the cryptosystem, i.e., we can compute E pai n 3 E pai n 2 (m) . Interestingly, the nested cryptosystems preserve the group structures over which they are defined. In other words we have
This homomorphic operation is similar to the generic additive operation from Section 3, with the inner "1" replaced by an encryption of 0. As a result, though the output is also a double-encrypted m i , a re-encryption has occurred on the inner ciphertext. This technique extends the layered-Paillier homomorphic property first observed by Lipmaa [18] .
The Obfuscator
We use the additive homomorphism and the special homomorphic property exhibited above to define a form of homomorphic matrix multiplication of matrices of ciphertexts. Given an N -permutation matrix Λ π = (λ π ij ) and randomness
In other words, we can do homomorphic matrix multiplication with a permutation matrix using layered Paillier, but we stress that the above matrix multiplication does not work for all matrices. We are now ready to define the obfuscator for the Paillier-based shuffle. Again, O pai does not use sk.
Definition 9 (Obfuscator). The obfuscator O pai for the re-encryption shuffle RS pai N takes as input a tuple (1 κ , n, sk, RS pai ), where (n, p) ∈ G pai (1 κ ) and
, and outputs a circuit with hardcoded However, because an extra layer of encryption is added at each step, the re-encryption actions are not truly composed with one another, e.g., the second stage re-encryption acts on the first stage's obfuscation layer, while the innermost ciphertext is reencrypted only on the first pass. Thus, in Section 7, we explain how to generate and obfuscate a Paillier re-encryption shuffle in a distributed way.
Proving Correctness of Obfuscation
We show how to prove the correctness of a BGN or Paillier obfuscation. We assume, for now, that a single party generates the encrypted matrix, though the techniques described here are immediately applicable to the distributed generation and proofs in Section 7. For either cryptosystem, we start with a trivially encrypted "identity matrix", and we let the prover demonstrate that he correctly shuffled the columns of this matrix. 
, and π ∈ Σ N .
In the BGN case, the starting identity matrix can be simply C = E pk (Λ id , 0 * ). Recall that, where the BGN matrix contains encryptions of 1, the Paillier matrix contains outer encryptions of different inner encryptions of zero, which need to remain secret. Thus, in the Paillier case, we begin by generating and proving correct a list of N double-encryptions of zero. We construct a proof of double-discrete log with 1/2-soundness that must be repeated a number of times.
This repetition remains "efficient enough" because we only need to perform a linear number of sets of repeated proofs. We then use these N double-encrypted zeros as the diagonal of our identity matrix, completing it with trivial outer encryptions of zero.
In both cases, we then take this identity matrix, shuffle and re-encrypt its columns, and provide a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the permutation and re-encryption factors. A verifier is then certain that the resulting matrix is a permutation matrix.
Proving a Shuffle of the Columns of a Ciphertext Matrix
Consider the simpler and extensively studied problem of proving that ciphertexts have been correctly re-encrypted and permuted, a so called "proof of shuffle". There are several known efficient methods [20, 14, 17, 28] for constructing a protocol for this relation. Although these protocols differ slightly in their properties, they all essentially give "honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge." As our protocol can be adapted to the concrete details of these techniques, we assume, for clarity, that there exists an honest verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π rp for the above relation. These protocols can be extended to prove a shuffle of lists of ciphertexts (which is what we need), but a detailed proof of this fact have not appeared. We present a simple batch proof (see [4] ) of a shuffle to allow us to argue more concretely about the complexity of our scheme.
Protocol 1 (Matrix Re-encryption-Permutation).
Common Input. A public key pk and C, C ∈ C N ×N pk Private Input. π ∈ Σ N and r ∈ R N ×N pk such that C = RE pk ((c i,π(j) ), r).
N randomly and hands it to P.
They both compute
They run the proof of a shuffle π rp on common input (pk, d, d ) and private input π, r = (
Proposition 3. Protocol 1 is public-coin and honest verifier zero-knowledge. For inputs with C = E pk (Λ π ) for π ∈ Σ N the error probability is negligible and there exists a knowledge extractor. Remark 1. When the plaintexts are known, and this is the case when C is an encryption of the identity matrix, slightly more efficient techniques can be used. This is sometimes called a "shuffle of known plaintexts" (see [20, 17, 28] ).
Proving Double Re-encryption
The following relation captures the problem of proving correctness of a doublere-encryption. 2 )s). Then it hands (e, f ) to V.
The protocol is iterated in parallel κ c times to make the error probability negligible. For proving a lists of ciphertexts, we use independent copies of the protocol for each element, but reuse the challenges. 
Distributed Generation and Obfuscation of a Shuffle
Our two constructions can be efficiently generated in a distributed fashion. Roughly, we begin with the trivial encryption of the identity matrix. (In the Paillier case, a sub-protocol is required to generate the inner-layer encryptions of the 0-diagonal using successive re-encryptions by the parties.) We then let each party in turn shuffle and re-encrypt the rows of this matrix. In the end, the resulting permutation matrix captures the composition of the shuffles from each party: it is as if the actions of a mix-net were captured ahead of time into an encrypted matrix, then unleashed onto the ciphertext inputs at shuffle time. The details of this process, including the proofs of correct shuffling and the UC proof of security, are provided in the full version of this paper.
Complexity Estimates
Our constructions clearly require O(N 2 ) exponentiations, but we give estimates that show that the constant hidden in the ordo-notation is reasonably small in some practical settings. For simplicity we assume that the cost of squaring a group element equals the cost of multiplying two group elements and that computing an exponentiation using a κ e -bit integer modulo a κ-bit integer corresponds to κ e /κ full exponentiations modulo a κ-bit integer. We optimize using fixed-base exponentiation and simultaneous exponentiation (see [19] ). We assume that evaluating the bilinear map corresponds to computing 6 exponentiations in the group G 1 and we assume that such one such exponentiation corresponds to 8 modular exponentiations. This seems reasonable, although we are not aware of any experimental evidence. In the Paillier case we assume that multiplication modulo n s is s 2 times as costly as multiplication modulo n. We assume that the proof of a shuffle requires 8N exponentiations (this is conservative).
Most exponentiations when sampling and obfuscating a shuffle are fixedbase exponentiations. The only exception is a single exponentiation each time an element is double-re-encrypted, but there are only N such elements. In the proof of correct obfuscation the bit-size κ c of the elements in the random vector u used in Protocol 1 is much smaller than the security parameter, and simultaneous exponentiation is applicable. In the Paillier case, simultaneous exponentiation is applicable during evaluation, and precomputation lowers the on-line complexity. Unfortunately, this does not work in the BGN case due to the bilinear map. We refer the reader to the Scheme program in the full paper for details on our estimates. For practical parameters we get the estimates in Fig. 2 . The table gives the complexity of the operations in terms of 10 4 modular κ-bit exponentiations and in parenthesis the estimated running time in hours assuming that κ = 1024, κc = κr = 50, and that one exponentiation takes 12 msec to compute (a 1024-bit exponentiation using GMP [16] takes 12 msec on our 3 GHz PC).
Given a single computer, the BGN construction is only practical when N ≈ 350 and the maximal number of bits in any submitted ciphertext is small. On the other hand, the Paillier construction is practical for normal sized voting precincts in the USA: N ≈ 2000 full length messages can be accommodated, and, given one week of pre-computing, the obfuscated shuffle can be evaluated overnight. Furthermore, all constructions are easily parallelized.
Conclusion
It is surprising that a functionality as powerful as a shuffle can be public-key obfuscated in any useful way. It is even more surprising that this can be achieved using the Paillier cryptosystem which, in contrast to the BGN cryptosystem, was not specifically designed to have the kind of "homomorphic" properties we exploit. One intriguing question is whether other useful "homomorphic" properties have been overlooked in existing cryptosystems.
From a practical point of view we stress that, although the performance of our mix-net is much worse than that of known constructions, it exhibits a property which no previous construction has: a relatively small group of mix-servers can prepare obfuscated shuffles for voting precincts. The precincts can compute the shuffling without any private key and produce ciphertexts ready for decryption.
A Proofs
Proof (Proposition 1). Denote by A an arbitrary adversary in the polynomial indistinguishability experiment run with the obfuscator O. Denote by A an adversary to the polynomial indistinguishability experiment Exp ind−b CS ,A (κ) with the cryptosystem CS defined as follows. It accepts a public key pk as input and forwards it to A. When A returns (DS π0 , DS π1 ), A outputs the two messages 0 and 1. Then it is given an encryption c (b) = E pk (b). Denote by Λ π0 and Λ π1 the two permutation matrices corresponding to DS π0 and DS π1 respectively. The adversary A defines a matrix C π b = (c 
Proof (Proposition 3).
Completeness and the fact that the protocol is public-coin follow by inspection. We now concentrate on the more interesting properties.
Zero-Knowledge. The honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator simply picks u randomly as in the protocol and then invokes the honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator of the subprotocol π rp . It follows that the simulated view is indistinguishable from the real view of the verifier.
Negligible Error Probability. Consider the following intuitively appealing lemma. Proof. Follows by elementary linear algebra (see [29] ).
By assumption C = E pk (Λ π ) for some π ∈ Σ N . Write Λ = D pk (C ). Then the lemma and the soundness of the proof of a shuffle π rp implies the soundness of the protocol.
Knowledge Extraction. For knowledge extraction we may now assume that C can be formed from C by permuting and re-encrypting its columns. Before we start we state a useful lemma.
Lemma 2. Let η be a product of κ/2-bit primes, let N be polynomially bounded in κ, and let u 1 , . . . , u l−1 ∈ Z N such that u jj = 1 mod η and u ji = 0 mod η for
N be randomly chosen, where 2 −κc is negligible. Then the probability that there exists a 1 , . . . , a l ∈ Z such that if we define u l = l j=1 a j u j mod η, then u l,l = 1 mod η, and u l,i = 0 mod η for i < l is overwhelming in κ.
Proof. Note that b = u l,l − l−1 j=1 u l,j u j,l is invertible with overwhelming probability, and when it is we view its inverse b −1 as an integer and define
It remains to exhibit a knowledge extractor. By assumption there exists a polynomial t(κ) and negligible knowledge error (κ) such that the extractor of the subprotocol π rp executes in time T γ (κ) = t(κ)/(γ − (κ)) for every common input (d, d ), induced by a random vector u, to the subprotocol such that the success probability of the subprotocol is γ . We invoke the extractor, but we must stop it if γ turns out to be too low and find a new random u that induces a common input to the subprotocol with a larger value of γ . We assume that the same negligible function (κ) bounds the failure probability in Lemma 2.
Consider a fixed common input (pk, C, C ) and prover P. Denote by γ the probability that P convinces V. We assume that (κ) < γ/4, i.e., the knowledge error will increase somewhat compared to the knowledge error of π rp .
We denote by B the distribution over {0, 1} given by p B (1) = γ/(8t(κ)). Note that this distribution can be sampled for any common input even without knowledge of γ, since we can simply perform a simulation of the protocol, pick an element from the space {1, . . . , 8t(κ)} randomly, and define the sample to be one if the prover succeeds and the picked element equal one. We are going to use the random variable to implicitly be able to say if an induced common input to the subprotocol gives a too low success probability γ . We now make this idea precise. The extractor proceeds as follows, where in the BGN case η denotes the modulus n and in the Paillier case η denotes the order of the plaintext space of the outer layer Paillier, i.e., n 2 where n is the modulus.
1. For l = 1, . . . , N do: (a) Start the simulation of an execution between V and P and denote by u l the random vector chosen by the simulator. Denote by (pk, d l , d l ) the common input to the subprotocol π rp induced by u l .
(b) If u l,j = u l,j for some j = j or if there does not exists a k,l ∈ Z such that l l =1 a k,l u l ,j equals one modulo η if j = l and it equals zero modulo η for j < l, then go to Step 1a. (c) Invoke the knowledge extractor of the protocol π rp on the common input (pk, d l , d l ). However, in between each step executed by the extractor, the distribution B is sampled. If a sample equals one before the extractor halts, then go to Step 1a. Otherwise, denote by π l and s l the permutation and extracted randomness such that ((pk, l,j ), where the division b ki /η is taken over the integers, and output (π, r).
We do the easy part of the analysis first. Consider the correctness of the output given that the extractor halts. Since u l,j = u l,j for all j = j and both D pk (C) and D pk (C ) are permutation matrices by assumption, we conclude that π 1 = . . . = π N = π for some permutation π ∈ Σ N . We have
Apply the a k,l as exponents on the left of Equation (1) and take the product over all l. This gives
Then apply the exponents a k,l on the right side of Equation (1) and take the product over all l. This gives In BGN Case. Note that b ki = 0 mod η for all k and i, and the order of any ciphertext divides η. Thus, the first product equals one in the ciphertext group. Furthermore, the randomizer space is Z η so we have c kj = E pk 0, We remark that s j is an element in Z * n 3 and not in Z * n as expected. However, it is a witness of re-encryption using alternative Paillier encryption.
It remains to prove that the extractor is efficient in terms of the inverse success probability of the prover. Fix an l. Denote by E the event that the prover succeeds to convince the adversary, i.e., Pr[E] = γ. Denote by S the set of vectors u such that Pr[E | u ∈ S] ≥ γ/2. An averaging argument implies that Pr[u ∈ S] ≥ γ/2. Denote by E u l the event that the go to statement in Step 1b is executed. We show that if u ∈ S, then a witness is extracted efficiently with constant probability, and if u ∈ S, then the extraction algorithm will be stopped relatively quickly. If u ∈ S, then we focus only on the distribution B. The expected number of samples from B needed before a sample is equal to one is clearly 1/p B (1) = 8t(κ)/γ. Thus, if we ignore the issue of finding the witness the simulation in Step 1c is efficient in terms of 1/γ. If u ∈ S, then the expected number of steps needed by the extractor of the subprotocol π rp is bounded by T γ/2 (κ). By Markov's inequality the probability that more than 2T γ/2 (κ) steps are needed is bounded by 1/2. The probability that one of the first ω = 2T γ/2 (κ) samples of B is one is bounded by 1 − (1 − p B (1)) ω ≤ 1 − e ω(−p B (1)+p B (1)
2 ) ≤ 1 − e −1/2 , since (κ) < γ/4. Thus, Step 1c executes in expected time 8t(κ)/γ, and from independence follows that it halts due to the extractor finding a witness with probability at least 1 −
